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Abstract
The Constitutions of 1988 in Brazil and 1991 in Colom-
bia have instantiated a complex process of transforma-
tive constitutionalism associated with the protection of 
rights, and the inclusion of minority groups. In spite of 
Resumo
As Constituições do Brasil de 1988 e da Colômbia de 1991 
deram início a um processo complexo de constituciona-
lismo transformativo associado à proteção de direitos 
e à inclusão de grupos minoritários. Apesar do papel 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The enactment of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, in 1988, 
marks a starting point for a time of constitutional transformations in Latin America. This 
Constitution, issued in an environment of distrust in the established public powers, is 
considered as the beginning of an era of democratization in the country, in which the 
Federal Supreme Court has had an increased role in its responsibility of “safeguarding 
the Constitution”1. Almost in parallel with this, and within the same perception of insti-
tutional distrust, in 1991 Colombia adopted its new Constitution based on democratic 
values and the protection of a wide range of fundamental rights (not only the classical 
liberal but also social and economic), establishing the Constitutional Court as an ins-
titution entrusted with safeguarding “the integrity and supremacy of the Constitution”2.
Although both countries share a long history of judicial review, after the 1988 
and 1991 Constitutions, both the Federal Supreme Court in Brazil and the Constitutio-
nal Court in Colombia have had international recognition as agents of social change 
1 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Art. 102.
2 Political Constitution of Colombia. Art. 241.
the prominent role of the judiciary in these processes, it 
should be stated that these Constitutions recognized the 
importance of the legislative branch within the transfor-
mations they seek to achieve. The question that remains 
open is whether a strong intervention by the judiciary is 
instrumental to put the legislature back in shape and put 
it in tune with the transformation that both Constitutions 
seek to achieve. As this paper will show, despite the good 
decisions delivered when deciding particular cases, over-
all, transformative constitutionalism based on the prom-
inent role of the Courts has not been that transformative 
in terms of reforming political institutions. In this sense, 
what this paper seeks to highlight is that, in order to de-
velop an adequate theory on judicial review, it is crucial 
to truly identify the limitations of constitutionalism and 
what judicial review can and cannot do.
Keywords: transformative constitutionalism; represen-
tative democracy; judicial review; political institutions; 
comparative constitutionalism.
proeminente do Judiciário nesses processos, deve-se afir-
mar que essas Constituições reconheceram a importância 
do Poder Legislativo dentro das transformações que bus-
cam alcançar. A questão que permanece em aberto é se 
uma forte intervenção do Judiciário é fundamental para 
colocar o Congresso de volta em forma e colocá-lo em sinto-
nia com a transformação que ambas as Constituições bus-
cam alcançar. Como este artigo mostrará, apesar das boas 
decisões tomadas ao decidir casos particulares, em geral o 
constitucionalismo transformador baseado no papel proe-
minente dos Tribunais não tem sido tão transformador em 
termos de reforma das instituições políticas. Nesse sentido, 
o que este artigo procura destacar é que, para desenvolver 
uma teoria adequada sobre o controle judicial, é crucial 
identificar verdadeiramente as limitações do constitucio-
nalismo e o que o controle judicial pode e não pode fazer.
Palavras-chave: constitucionalismo transformador; de-
mocracia representativa; controle judicial; instituições po-
líticas; constitucionalismo comparado.
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within systems in which democratic values  are threatened due to somehow dysfunc-
tional political institutions. Notwithstanding this, there have been several objections 
made to these Courts in the context of pluralist and rifted democratic societies, in par-
ticular, regarding their capabilities of transforming the political institutions, rather than 
making by themselves most of the decisions of principle and public policy. 
This paper will analyze if the Constitutions of 1988 in Brazil and 1991 in Colom-
bia were aimed at disenfranchising the political representative institutions. As it will be 
seen through a brief study of the formation of these Constitutions and their main in-
stitutional designs, instead of this, they aimed at reinforcing such institutions, opening 
them to “the people”. In spite of the above, Courts have had a central role in developing 
these Constitutions, and despite the good decisions delivered when deciding particu-
lar cases, overall, transformative constitutionalism based on the prominent role of the 
Courts has not been that transformative in terms of reforming political institutions. In 
this sense, what this paper seeks to highlight is that, in order to develop an adequate 
theory on judicial review, it is crucial to truly identify the limitations of constitutionalism 
and what judicial review can and cannot do.
2. BRAZIL 1988 AND COLOMBIA 1991: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF 
VALUE PLURALISM AND THE REINFORCEMENT OF DEMOCRACY
In 1985, after more than two decades of military rule in Brazil, the newly elec-
ted civilian government adopted a constitutional amendment empowering the next 
Congress to serve as a constituent assembly3. Through a process of deliberation which 
involved the participation of 13 political parties that conformed an Assembly of 559 
members, on October 5, 1988, and within the framework of a slow and gradual pro-
cess of transition to democracy called abertura (opening)4, the new Constitution of the 
Federative Republic of Brazil was adopted. This constitutional process is highly valued 
by the idea of pluralism it implied, to the point that the 1988 Constitution is a highly 
complex document, which includes a long set of rights5, and judicial injuctions. Its con-
tent also has “a strong emphasis on human dignity (one of the constitution’s fundamental 
principles), democratic rule, and a vast raft of fundamental rights, including a range of so-
cial and economic rights (although the text is silent as to whether they are justiciable)”6. The 
3 Constitutional Amendment No. 26 of November 27, 1985.
4 See, VIEIRA, Oscar Vilhena. The Descriptive Overview of the Brazilian Constitution and Supreme Court. In: 
VIEIRA, Oscar Vilhena (et. al.). Transformative Constitutionalism: comparing the apex courts of Brazil, India 
and South Africa, 2013. p. 75.
5 Marmor has developed an argument stating that in divided societies which include value pluralism there is a 
strong tendency toward ‘rights talk’. See, MARMOR, Andrei. On the limits of rights. In: MARMOR, Andrei. Law in 
the Age of Pluralism. Oxford Univeristy Press, 2007.
6 DALY, Tom Gerald. The Alchemists: Questioning our Faith in Courts as Democracy-Builders. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017.
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1988 Constitution has been regarded as being designed to weaken the executive and 
to strengthen the legislature and judiciary7.
The judiciary, as established in the 1988 Constitution, “checks both the legislatu-
re and the executive through the power of judicial review”8. The Federal Supreme Court’s 
review powers were enhanced by expanding access to an existing abstract review me-
chanism (the direct action of unconstitutionality)9. Notwithstanding the amplified role 
of the Court at the center of the constitutional order as being the “guardian of the Cons-
titution”10, said powers were established with recognition to the other public powers 
(specially the legislative), and even exercised, at least during early stages of the new 
charter, with caution and restraint.
One example of this can be seen in the 1988 Constitution’s measure regarding 
legislative omission, contained in paragraph 2, article 103 of the constitutional text11. 
This provision, rather than encouraging the Court to determine the content of the la-
cking measure or get into public policy making, is aimed at the issuance of a declara-
tion of unconstitutionality and a notification to the competent power for the adoption 
of the necessary actions. The judiciary is called to raise a ‘red flag’ when action is nee-
ded, but not to take action by itself12. In exercising this power,
[u]nlike the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s energetic and expansive use in the early 
1990’s of its power to address legislative omission (before it fell out of favor with the ju-
dges), the Brazilian Supreme Court took a relatively cautious approach to its new power 
to address legislative omission, keeping to simple declarations that legislation was re-
quired to give effect to a constitutional provision13. 
7 See, ROSENN, Keith. Separation of Powers in Brazil. Duquesne Law Review, Miami, v. 47, p. 839-870, 2009.
8 ROSENN, Keith. Separation of Powers in Brazil. Duquesne Law Review, Miami, v. 47, p. 839-870, 2009.
9 For a summary on judicial review in the Brazilian system, see: MALISKA, Marcos. The Brazilian Judicial Review. 
Education & Science Without Borders, Curitiba, vol. 6, n. 12, p. 54-57, 2015. As the author exposes, “In the 
Brazilian constitutional system all judges have constitutional jurisdiction. In other words all judges have the power 
to declare a law unconstitutional. The declaration of unconstitutionality is made incidentally in the judicial case that 
is being analyzed. There is in Brazil the concentrated control of constitutionality too. In the concentrated control of 
constitutionality the Supreme Federal Court is the only competent organ of the judiciary to rule on the claim of un-
constitutionality. These are called direct actions of the unconstitutionality in which the main claim (merit of action) 
is a declaration of unconstitutionality. In these lawsuits there is not proper case, only an abstract discussion if a law 
is not contrary to the constitution”.
10 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Article 102.
11 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Article 103. “Paragraph 2. When unconstitutionality is declared 
on account of lack of a measure to render a constitutional provision effective, the competent Power shall be notified for 
the adoption of the necessary actions and, in the case of an administrative body, to do so within thirty days”.
12 A similar process, was proposed in Colombian in the 1910 constitutional assembly, although a model of 
‘strong’ judicial review was finally enacted. 
13 DALY, Tom Gerald. The Alchemists: Questioning our Faith in Courts as Democracy-Builders. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017.
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In addition to this, it should be noted that the institutional design established 
in the 1988 Constitution gave great prominence to the legislative branch, which was 
entrusted with the power of regulating constitutional provisions through statutory 
lawmaking, thus recognizing the importance that Congress should have in the develo-
pment of constitutional values14. In this sense, more than seeking to disenfranchise the 
political representative institutions, the Constitution aimed at confronting the previous 
hegemonic supremacy of the executive branch, in favor of a harmonious collaboration 
with the legislative branch which was in charge of regulating the content of the consti-
tutional text, and with a Federal Supreme Court granted with renewed powers.
In the Colombian context, in 1991 a Constitutional Assembly, that enjoyed the 
support of the majority of society15, was regarded as a “consensual attempt to broad-
en democracy, as a means to confront a generalized state of political corruption and vio-
lence”16. This Assembly became an icon of a peaceful transition, and the recognition of 
value pluralism that achieved an inclusive dialogue between different sectors of the 
Colombian society. Even guerrilla groups, indigenous and afro communities were given 
a seat at the Assembly. Furthermore, the M-19 –a former guerrilla group- won an im-
portant part of the Assembly seats17. The enacted constitutional text introduced a wide 
catalogue of rights18, and new and more inclusive judicial procedures for the enforce-
ment and protection of fundamental rights like the acción popular, acción de grupo and 
acción de tutela were adopted.
The institutional design adopted by the 1991 Constitution was complex: the 
Constitutional Court was created as a ‘powerful court’, but entrusted with an exhaustive 
list of functions such as judicial review of laws, judicial review on procedural grounds 
of constitutional amendments, and as a check on the executive branch during ‘times of 
emergency’ (among others). In addition to this, said Court was entrusted with the fun-
damental rights adjudication, when undertaking the review of the expedite protection 
of such rights via accion de tutela19, by other judges. 
14 See, Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil. Articles 44-75.
15 For a comprehensive account of this process see, LEMAITRE RIPOLL, Julieta. El Derecho Como Conjuro. Bo-
gotá: Uniandes y Siglo del Hombre Editores, 2009. 
16 UPRIMNY YEPES, Rodrigo. Should Courts enforce Social Rights? The Experience of the Colombian Constitutio-
nal Court. In: COOMANS, Fons, (ed.). Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights: Experiences from Domestic 
Systems. Antwerpen-Oxford: Intersentia, 2006.
17 In fact, it was the second political force at the Constitutional Assembly, just after the traditional liberal Party.
18 Although the Constitutional text, in article 85, specified that just some rights would have immediate applica-
tion (mostly classical liberal-individual rights) while the others, should be subject to legislative development. 
While the Colombian Constitution does not include a clause like article 103.2 of the Brazilian Constitution, the 
Court has developed almost every right in the Constitution, even in absence of legislative action, this has been 
controversial even within the Court, as can be seen in the concurring opinion of decision T-175 of 2013.
19 Article 86 of the 1991 Colombian Constitution defines the tutela by stating that: “Every individual may 
claim legal protection before the judge, at any time or place, through a preferential and summary procee-
ding, for himself/herself or by whoever acts in his/her name, the immediate protection of his/her fundamental 
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However, one of the main aims of this Assembly was to rescue the legislative 
branch from the ostracism that it had under the 1886 Colombian Constitution, due to 
the excessive power given to the executive branch. In this sense, for instance, one of the 
delegates at the Constituent Assembly expressed that: 
[t]he Legislative branch cannot transfer to the hands of another the power to make laws, 
due to the fact that it only has that power by delegation of the people (…) the legislative 
branch cannot transfer its power to another branch, it must be kept where the people 
bestowed it. In our country, the Executive branch through its famous extraordinary facul-
ties expedites ninety percent of our statutes, such powers must disappear20. 
Although both the Brazilian and Colombian Constitutions have instantiated a 
complex process of transformative constitutionalism associated with the protection 
of rights21, and the inclusion of minority groups, it should be stated that both Cons-
titutions recognized the importance of the legislative branch within this process, on 
the one hand, and empowered the Courts in its limited functions as “guardians” of the 
Constitution, on the other. The question that remains open is whether a strong inter-
vention by the judiciary is instrumental to put the legislature back in shape22 and put it 
in tune with the transformation that both Constitutions seek to achieve. 
constitutional rights when the individual fears the latter may be jeopardized or threatened by the action or 
omission of any public authority (...)”.
20 See, 1991 Constituent Assembly Records, Delegate Jaime Arias López (1991). At. Volume 80, p. 3.
21 It is a highly contested issue, whether such transformation should be undertaken by the Court itself or by 
political institutions. For instance, Ruth Gavison has developed a critical assessment toward strong judicial 
activism aimed at ‘social transformation’. See, GAVISON, Ruth. The Role of Courts in Drifted Democracies. Israel 
Law Review, vol. 33, n. 2, p. 216-258. 1999.
22 David Landau, has argued that the Colombian Court has tried to do this in some decisions, basically in 
the decision C-816 of 2004. See, LANDAU, David. A Dynamic Theory of Judicial Role. Boston College Law 
Review, Boston, vol. 55, n. 5, p. 1501-1562. 2014. Also, the Colombian Constitutional Court, in a recent deci-
sion (C-332 of 2017) stated that deliberation in Congress is fundamental to the 1991 Constitution, and thus 
struck down part of the special process for the implementation of the peace agreement signed between the 
Colombian government and FARC guerilla, which limited congressional deliberation. Although this decision 
may be regarded as a good decision in terms of proctecting deliberation, several objections can be raised 
to the theory used by the Court to reach such decision, for instance see the dissenting opinion by Justice 
Alejandro Linares-Cantillo. 
For a general objection to this theory of unconstitutional constitutional amendments, see: BENITEZ, Vicente. 
Constitución Popular, No Judicial: una teoría democrática del control de constitucionalidad de las reformas a la 
Constitución en Colombia. Bogotá, Legis, 2014 and GNECCO, Francisco; GARCIA, Santiago, La teoría de la 
sustitución: de la protección de la supremacía e integridad de la constitución, a la aniquilación de la titu-
laridad del poder de reforma constitucional en el órgano legislative. Revista Universitas, vol. 65, No. 133, 
2016. p. 59-103.
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3. TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND POLITICAL INS-
TITUTIONS
Even though, both the Brazilian and the Colombian Constitutions aimed at 
strengthening the political process23 and the legislative branch, most of the constitu-
tional law literature continues to portray legislators, in theoretical studies, as self-inte-
rested individuals seeking only to win reelection and maximize their private interests. 
Thus, they are shown as not to be trustworthy of “the people”, and even more, as indi-
viduals who can not take the Constitution and the values and rights it includes seriou-
sly24. Legislators are not only depicted as being vulnerable to the public opinion, as the 
result of being dependent on the electoral democratic process, but also Congress itself 
is shown as a dysfunctional institution worried only on bargaining on self-interest, but 
not in achieving the well-being of the citizens. Congress is shown as being unable to 
have discussions of principles, while the judiciary is a ‘forum of principles’25. Perhaps, in 
countries like Colombia and Brazil, it is hard to undertake an empirical defense of legis-
latures26, but it is worth considering that their Constitutions were not aimed at disen-
franchising Congress as a political-representative institution, but rather to transform it 
into a pluralist forum that can truly exemplify their citizens, as well as the plurality that 
lies at the base of the population, cultures, and moral-political thought. 
Even if both the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court and the Colombian Constitutio-
nal Court play a central role in the constitutional arrangements of both Constitutions, it 
must be acknowledged that Congress has not disappeared from constitutional designs. 
Congress, in a Constitution like the Colombian and the Brazilian “is not a supreme insti-
tution”, it is limited by it, “but this desirable limitation of the power of the legislature should 
not be taken to mean that is has lost its status as the best reflection within government of 
the source of political power- the people-”27. There is an urgent need in constructing a nar-
rative of Congress as an institution that, in the light of pluralism and disagreement, can 
23 In a recent work on transformative constitutionalism, it has been argued how it is not circumscribed to the 
Global South, and also how the transformations it seeks to achieve are not limited to battles in Constitutional 
Courts. See, HAILBRONNER, Michaela. Transformative Constitutionalism: Not Only in the Global South. Ameri-
can Journal of Comparative Law, vol. 65, n. 3, p. 527-565, Nov. 2017.
24 For a description on this assumption see: PARKER, Richard. “Here, the People Rule”: A Constitutional Popu-
list Manifesto. Boston: Harvard University Press, 1994.; WALDRON, Jeremy. Law and Disagreement. Oxford 
University Press, 1999.; GARRET, Elizabeth; VERMEULE, Adrian. Institutional Design of a Thayeran Congress. 
Duke Law Journal, vol. 50, n. 5, 2001.
25 DWORKIN, Ronald. The forum of principle. New York University Law Journal, vol. 56, n. 469, 1981.
26 This argument is circumscribed to these particular contexts, provided that authors like Jeremy Waldron have 
also undertaken empirical defense of legislatures. See: WALDRON, Jeremy. Law and Disagreement. Oxford 
University Press, 1999; BAUMAN, Richard; KAHANA, Tsvi. The least examined branch. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006; WALDRON, Jeremy, The Dignity of Legislation. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
27 GAVISON, Ruth. Legislatures and the Phases and Components of Constitutionalism. In: BAUMAN, Richard; 
KAHANA, Tsvi (Eds.). The least examined branch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
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truly respect the equality of all citizens by the democratic process of decision-making, 
by giving them the opportunity of having their interests equally considered28 and by 
the same token giving them the possibility to influence the decision stage. Thus, there 
is a need to recover the willingness of citizens to engage in a deliberative process with 
those who they disagree, in the political arena and not only through litigation29. 
During the last decades, and due to the good particular results that judicial de-
cisions have achieved30, there has been very few scholarly interest in examining legis-
latures, and thinking on how they can be improved, in order to implement the values 
that were entrenched in highly plural and democratic Constitutions like the Colombian 
and the Brazilian. However, building an aspirational idea of Congress can instantiate a 
healthy discussion on the legal and constitutional reforms that are needed to put this 
institution back in shape.  
Such depiction of Congress should depart from the same idea of value plura-
lism entailed by these Constitutions. As a result of such pluralism, the Constitution in-
cludes abstract and open-ended clauses that are undeniably essentially contested con-
cepts31. As Marmor describes them, they are “general constitutional provisions containing 
abstract moral-political principles” which “might be seen as a kind of vague and general 
framework, setting the language in which moral-political concerns need to be phrased, but 
leaving the content of the relevant expressions free for us to shape as we deem right at any 
given time”32. Such approach leads to the question of who should shape those general 
constitutional provisions. 
In a pluralist society committed with some form of equal distribution of political 
power33, the answer seems to be in favor of the people themselves or through their 
elected and accountable representatives, in a deliberative scenario, under the rules of 
some epistemic procedures where political equality is guaranteed by openness of deli-
beration, and voting as aggregation comes after a careful public debate34.
28 See, CHRISTIANO, Thomas. The Authority of Democracy. The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 12, n. 3, 
2004.; and MARMOR, Andrei. Authority, Equality and Democracy. In: MARMOR, Andrei. Law in the Age of Plu-
ralism. Oxford University Press, 2007.
29 For a comprehensive account of this, see: MORTON, F.L.; KNOPFF, RAINER. The Charter Revolution & The 
Court Party. University Toronto Press, 2000.
30 See, UPRIMNY YEPES, Rodrigo. Should Courts enforce Social Rights?: The Experience of the Colombian Cons-
titutional Court. In: COOMANS, Fons, (ed.). Justiciability of Economic and Social Rights: Experiences from 
Domestic Systems. Antwerpen-Oxford: Intersentia, 2006.
31 See, GALLIE, W.B. Esentially Contested Concepts. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, vol. 56, n. 167, 
1955-1956. p. 167-198.
32 MARMOR, Andrei. Meaning and Belief in Constitutional Interpretation. Fordham Law Review, vol. 82, n. 565, 
nov. 2013.
33 See, MARMOR, Andrei. Law in the Age of Pluralism. Oxford University Press, 2007.
34 ESTLUND, David (et. Al). The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy. The 
Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 18, n. 1, 2010, p. 54-100.
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It far exceeds the aim of this paper to provide a comprehensive description of 
what reforms should be undertaken as to have a well-ordered legislative branch. But 
a sound institutional design of Congress must arise as a truly deliberative institution 
which not only hears but also values the voices of the minority groups, of regional 
interests, and of the laymen. It should be an institution with clear and easy to unders-
tand rules of deliberation that not only enhances debate and allows the intensity of 
preference to be duly channeled, but also respects equality at the decision stage. The 
electoral arrangements should be constructed to allow elections to be truly ruled by 
the principle of one-person one-vote, and not to be distorted through the flow of 
money to politics35. Congress should be committed to deliberation, as Vermeule and 
Garret explain,
deliberation exploits the collective character of legislatures in ways that can, in principle, 
improve Congress’s constitutional performance. Among the concrete benefits of delibe-
ration are its tendencies to encourage the revelation of private information, to expose 
extreme, polarized viewpoints to the moderating effect of diverse arguments, to legiti-
mate outcomes by providing reasons to defeated parties, and to require the articulation 
of public-spirited justification for legislator’s votes […] In addition, deliberation makes 
congressional decision-making more accessible and transparent to the public, which 
increases accountability of the decision makers and may enhance the perceived legiti-
macy of the outcome36. 
Also, a culture of accountability must be promoted among citizens, so that the self-inte-
rest of reelection can be connected to the broad interest of respect for the Constitution 
and people’s rights. 
As some authors have pointed out, discussions at legislative level with the in-
volvement of citizens and their representatives might instantiate a culture of tolerance 
among citizens. Jeremy Waldron has stressed this argument by following the thoughts 
of the philosopher Bernard Williams and pointing out the difference between being 
able to say to a losing opponent, “Well, you lost” and saying to him, “You were wrong” or 
“You were proved wrong.” The former saying, “Well you lost,” is compatible with recognizing 
his position as honest and honorable; it’s like saying, “Better luck next time.”37. In his view, 
the first attitude, being associated with the democratic and majoritarian procedures, 
35 In the Brazilian context, Roberto Unger has called for an urgent reorganization of electoral politics, and the 
empowerment of the Civil Society. See, UNGER, Roberto Mangabeira. Democracy Realized: the progressive 
alternative. New York: Verso, 2001.
36 GARRET, Elizabeth; VERMEULE, Adrian. Institutional Design of a Thayeran Congress. Duke Law Journal, Vol. 
50, No. 5, 2001.
37 This argument is taken from a lecture delivered by Jeremy Waldron, Forthcoming in Spanish: WALDRON, 
Jeremy. Control de Constitutionalidad y Legitimidad Política. Díkaion, Vol. 27, No. 1, 2018.
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and the last one being more common with ‘moral victories’ within the process of inter-
pretation of abstract terms by courts, a process that might send a message that such 
decisions might be reached in a sort of timeless fashion, declaring a timeless moral truth, 
as it were; with the problem for civil tolerance, that such a message conveys to the losing 
party that it has got its profound moral principles wrong38. Although these arguments 
are not conclusive, they should give us some pause as for thinking on courts as the 
sole agents in the application of a transformative constitution, -usually ruling in highly 
divided societies, aiming at reconciliation and at a higher level of tolerance and civility- 
and should call for more attention to improve the shape of representative institutions 
like legislatures. 
After these brief considerations on the role of Congress in the context of cons-
titutionalism, it is important to ask whether the strong intervention of the Courts, by 
means of judicial review, that has been the consequence of both the Brazilian and Co-
lombian 1988 and 1991 constitutions, respectively, can be helpful for shaping a ‘healthy 
legislature’. Sometimes it is assumed that a strong substantial intervention by Courts 
will improve the quality of legislative outcomes, provided that “if legislators know in ad-
vance that a piece of legislation they seek to enact is likely to be struck down as unconstitu-
tional, they would refrain from trying to enact it”. 
However, as Garret and Vermeule explain, “that it is just not necessarily, or even 
typically, the case; scholars have long pointed out that legislators often go ahead with an 
act they expect to be struck down as unconstitutional because it gives them the populist 
political benefit vis-à-vis their constituents without actually bearing the responsibility for 
the unwanted consequences of the proposed legislation”39. In this sense, critics of judi-
cial review doubt that substantive judicial intervention is good for putting back into 
shape a dysfunctional legislative institution. For instance, Tushnet has argued that 
since legislators act in the in the court’s shadow, “we really cannot know how Congress 
would perform if the courts exited, if Congress does badly because the Courts are on the 
scene”40. 
On the other hand, Marmor also questions this possibility, based on the fact 
that unconstitutionality is not regarded as a sanction on the legislature, and therefo-
re it does not deter Congress from proposing and enacting questionable measures, 
thus opening the doors for openly unconstitutional and populist proposals. At the end, 
following Marmor’s observations, a strong intervention from the constitutional courts 
can promote the disenfranchisement of a culture of political accountability, based 
38 MARMOR, Andrei. Constitutional Interpretation. USC Law and Public Policy Research Paper, Los Angeles, 
vol. 4, n. 4, 2004.
39 MARMOR, Andrei. Randomized Judicial Review. USC Law Legal Studies Paper, Los Angeles, vol. 15, n. 8, 
2015. 
40 TUSHNET, Mark. Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts. Princeton University Press, 2000.
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on constitutional grounds41. Furthermore, even defenders of judicial review, as Walu-
chow, call the attention on the need to undertake reforms to improve the legislative 
branch, and not to solely rely on the decisions of courts, even if they might yield good 
decisions42. 
Other accounts, which favor judicial review, but take a modest approach towards 
the changes it can achieve43, highlight that judicial intervention can be instrumental to 
strengthen the democratic decision making, and even fortify the representative insti-
tutions as the legislatures. Hart Ely, for example, argued that judicial review could be 
used as a guardianship on the existence conditions of laws44, and especially in the de-
liberative conditions that a representative democracy needs, like the inclusion of the 
minorities in the debates and decision-making on topics that certainly affect them45. In 
a case-based study of new democracies, including Brazil and Colombia, Daly has shown 
that this assertion is not conclusive, but that even said courts themselves cannot achie-
ve all the changes needed for a well-shaped democracy there are some steps that these 
courts can help to take toward democratization46. 
Therefore, the question on whether constitutional courts are good at promoting 
deliberation and democracy, is a contested matter, but a constitutional court can be 
regarded as an antidote to the pathologies of the democratic process47, and therefore, 
as having a limited role as to be in charge of reviewing the existence conditions of 
the laws, and undertaking a procedural review of the legislature, but not as a mere 
41 See, MARMOR, Andrei. Randomized Judicial Review. USC Law Legal Studies Paper, Los Angeles, vol. 15, n. 
8, 2015. This argument is also developed by BRADLEY THAYER, James. The Origin and Scope of the American 
Doctrine of Constitutional Law. Harvard Law Review, vol. 7, n. 3, Oct. 25, 1893.; GARRET, Elizabeth; VERMEULE, 
Adrian. Institutional Design of a Thayeran Congress, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 50, No. 5, 2001.
42 WALUCHOW, Wilfrid. A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review: The living Tree. Cambridge Studies in Phi-
losophy and Law. 2009.
43 Some authors, like Richard Fallon Jr. have portrayed judicial review, as an additional check that might im-
prove the protections of rights. However, this account of judicial review, does not deny the need of a strong 
legislature, as a forum where rights can also be defended and protected. See, FALLON, Richard. The Core Of An 
Uneasy Case For Judicial Review. Harvard Law Review, vol. 121, n. 7, May, 2008.
44 ADLER, Matthew; DORF, Michael. C. Constitutional Existence Conditions and Judicial Review. Virginia Law 
Review, vol. 89, n. 6, 1105-1202, Oct. 2003.
45 See, HART ELY, John. Democracy and Distrust. Harvard University Press, 1980.
46 DALY, Tom Gerald. The Alchemists: Questioning our Faith in Courts as Democracy-Builders. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2017.
47 Some authors have argued that this antidote can be dangerous for pluralist and democratic societies, provi-
ded that judges may use their powers to favor some sort of status-quo, rather than to empower disenfranchi-
sed groups. The role of judges, briefly described here is modest, and restrained, and the interventions hereby 
proposed are more in the context of the “non-core” cases that Waldron exemplifies in The Core of the Case 
against Judicial Review. For this discussion see: MORTON, F.L.; KNOPFF, RAINER. The Charter Revolution & The 
Court Party. University Toronto Press, 2000.; MANDEL, Michael, The Charter of Rights and the Legalization 
of Politics in Canada. Thompson Educational Publishers, 1994.; MANDEL, Michael. A Brief History of the New 
Constitutionalism, or “How We Changed Everything So that Everything Would Remain the Same. Israel Law 
Review. vol.  32, n. 2, 1998.
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review of formalism, but also as making sure that the rules of deliberation48, and the 
inclusion of the minorities and disenfranchised groups are met. Those are minimal con-
ditions of a pluralist democracy, as the one aimed by both the Brazilian and Colombian 
Constitutions. 
As a result, in Constitutions like the Brazilian and the Colombian, the role of ju-
dges should be aimed at the transformation of the legislative branch49, not as to disa-
ppear it or to disenfranchise it from the discussions on questions of principle, rights and 
public policy, but rather to promote the conditions of deliberation in the political bran-
ches, and to truly transform it into a pluralist, and politically accountable forum where 
the discussions needed in the context of the transformative constitutionalism can take 
place. It has been a long-contested issue whether courts can bring about social chan-
ge50, but even when the answer to this issue goes to the court’s side, it is uncontested 
that legislatures are also needed in the process of achieving a true and lasting social 
change. First, because they are instrumental to open spaces where decisions are taken 
in the midst of a pluralist assembly, that reflects the differences and the diversity of so-
cieties, and that at the end are accountable to the citizens51. Legislatures in well shape, 
can promote deliberation not only at the elected representatives level, but also at the 
48 A similar argument, was put forward by Dorf and Sabel, who described that judicial review could serve de-
mocracy by giving fewer definitive answers to legal, social, and ultimately political questions while inquiring into 
more of the political actors’ own deliberative capacities. Thus, they proposed judicial review to be exercised as 
a review of the admissibility of the reasons private and political actors themselves give for their decisions, and the 
respect they actually accord those reasons: a review, that is, of whether the protagonists have themselves been suf-
ficiently attentive to the legal factors that constrain the framing of alternatives and the process of choosing among 
them. DORF, Michael C.; SABEL, Charles F. A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism. Columbia Law Re-
view. vol. 98, n. 2, Mar, 1998.
49 This approach also demands restraint and humility from the Courts, provided that, as Daly (2017) states, a 
strong judicialization of politics “should not glibly be taken as a sign of a positive democratization trajectory, it can 
just as easily signal deep-rooted problems in a state’s democratic development”, it is preferable to have some de-
ference toward the political process self-regulations, as Garret (2002) explains “judicial decisions that establish 
the structure of parties are problematic because courts constitutionalize the policy choices they make, even though 
those choices are not necessarily compelled by the Constitution”. This deference is justified, for example, when 
the political powers show that they are capable of protecting dissent and minorities, as recently happened in 
Colombia with the enactment of a statute protecting political opposition, which was upheld by the Court in 
decision C-018 of 2018.
50 See, RODRÍGUEZ GARAVITO, Cesar; RODRÍGUEZ FRANCO, Diana. Cortes y cambio social: cómo la Corte Con-
stitucional transformó el desplazamiento forzado en Colombia. Colección Dejusticia, 2010.; BONILLA, Daniel 
(ed.). Constitucionalismo del Sur Global. Bogotá: Siglo del Hombre Editores. 2015. More critical views are 
pointed out in the following: GARGARELLA, Roberto. La Sala de Máquinas de la Constitución: dos siglos de 
constitucionalismo en América Latina (1810-2010). Buenos Aires: Katz Editores, 2015.; DALY, Tom Gerald. The 
Alchemists: Questioning our Faith in Courts as Democracy-Builders. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017.; ROSENBERG, Gerarld. The Hollow Hope. University of Chicago University Press, 2008.
51 As Gavison, states Courts can help strengthen political institutions, if they “are there to strengthen accoun-
tability, but their functioning should not undermine the effectiveness of government. Furthermore, political, 
non-judicial forces should have a large role in strengthening the “accountability” side of government and le-
gislatures”. See, GAVISON, Ruth. The Role of Courts in Drifted Democracies. Israel Law Review, vol. 33, n. 2, p. 
216-258. 1999.
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laymen level, thus promoting a democratic culture where the questions of principle 
and public policy are opened to all the persons affected by them and not only to elites 
of either politicians or jurists. 
Latin-American scholars have pointed out how the constitutions regarded as 
transformative have not been so ambitious in reshaping the political institutions52. In 
spite of the rich catalogue of rights that they have included, and the positive role that 
they claim from the State as to make them available for all citizens, the organic structu-
re of these constitutions remains similar to the one that the constitutionalism from the 
XIX century promoted. However, this process of transformation should also be taken 
to the organic level, and perhaps more efforts should be made to rescue the legislati-
ve branch, as a forum where the content of these rights, and social changes could be 
achieved, in light of an inclusive deliberation among equals53, where the representati-
ves of the people are free to speak without unwanted interruptions or intimidations, by 
arguments justified with reasons, and where equal respect and consideration is paid to 
the multiple arguments that are presented54. 
An objection to these arguments can be raised by stating that not only by wri-
ting positively about Congress will things become better. To this objection it should 
be replied, that knowing the limitations of the capabilities of courts in processes of 
democratization, and transformation of political institutions can help to construct rea-
listic demands on the Courts role, and to acknowledge that the political branches are at 
least as crucial to the functioning of democracy as are the courts55. Also, in a theorethical 
level, the fact that a conception of democracy is hard to achive, does not entail that as 
a matter of principle it should be deemed as wrong56. 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FINAL REMARKS
As a modest conclusion, and even if it sounds as a truism, it should be stated 
that both the Brazilian and the Colombian Constitutions aimed at transforming their 
legislative institutions into pluralists, and deliberative forums, accountable to citizens, 
52 GARGARELLA, Roberto. La Sala de Máquinas de la Constitución: dos siglos de constitucionalismo en 
América Latina (1810-2010). Katz Editores, 2015.
53 Although some bargaining and compromise is inevitable in these legislative scenarios, there are devices of 
institutional design in order to put these situations in favor of weak political parties, such as by the establish-
ment of super majorities in decisions that are highly valuable and sensitive. 
54 STEINER, Jurg. Citizens’ Deliberation and Human Rights. In: SAUL, Mathew, Follesdal Andreas; ULFSTEIN, Geir 
(eds.). The International Human Rights Judiciary and National Parliments. Cambridge University Press, 
2017.; STEINER, Jurg; JARAMILLO, Maria Clara; MAIA, Rousile; MAMELI, Simona. Deliberation Across Deep Di-
visions. Transformative Moments, Cambridge University Press, 2016. 
55 GAVISON, Ruth. The Role of Courts in Drifted Democracies. Israel Law Review, vol. 33, n. 2, p. 216-258. 
1999.
56 ESTLUND, David. Epistemic Proceduralism and Democratic Authority. In: GEENES, Raf; TINNEVELT, Ronald 
(eds.). Does Truth Matter? Democracy and Public Space. Springer: Dordrecht, 2008.
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and capable of undertaking discussions of rights and principle. Even if the empirical si-
tuation does not favor this aspiration, there is an urgent need to rescue the legislatures 
and put them back in good shape, since they are institutions that can channel the voi-
ces of pluralist and diverse groups when deliberation is taken seriously. Also, it is hard to 
rescue the legislative branch from the ostracism if it is shown as a dispensable branch of 
government, a perception that can be easily exacerbated if most of the discussions on 
principle, rights and even public policy are made by the judiciary. 
There is obviously a need to undertake legal reforms that strengthen political 
parties, aimed for example at the promotion of the participation of minority parties 
and social groups, and to guarantee the openness and honesty in political campaigns 
and congressional deliberation. Perhaps the role of the Brazilian and Colombian Courts 
in this transformation is better played by being the guardians of the rules of delibera-
tion, by taking actions to promote pluralism, and by promoting the discussion among 
equals at the legislature, as a modest antidote to the dysfunctionality of such branch, 
than by making most of the decisions of principle, rights and public policy. 
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